# 1NC – NUSO r3 – Wake KT

## 1

### 1NC – Topicality

#### Topicality:

Our interpretation is that affirmative teams must defend the desirability of a topical plan:

#### a---‘Resolved’ denotes a formal resolution.

**AWS ’13** [Army Writing Style; August 24th; Online resource dedicated to all major writing requirements in the Army; Army Writing Style, "Punctuation — The Colon and Semicolon," <https://armywritingstyle.com/punctuation-the-colon-and-semicolon/>]

The colon introduces the following:

a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis.

b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.)

c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it?

d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment.

e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock

g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:". Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### b---‘USfg’ is the 3 branches.

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people

#### c---‘Increase’ means to make greater.

Kristl ’4 [Kenneth T, James R May, Keri N Powell, Howard I Fox, John D Walke, David G McIntosh, Ann B Weeks, Jonathan F Lewis; October 26; Partner at Winston & Strawn LLP, Former Law Clerk to District Court Judge William C. Lee, J.D. from Chicago-Kent College of Law; Westlaw, Appellate Brief in “the State of New York v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,” WL 5846438]

The sole textual basis EPA asserts for its extraordinary position is an argument based on the word “increases” in §111(a)(4). Specifically, EPA claims that, even when a change causes emissions to rise to the highest level reached in the past ten years, it does not “increase[]” them. EPA Br. 69-71, 86. According to EPA's untenable argument, Congress did not specify how an increase is to be measured, and thus left EPA free to interpret “increases” as it wishes. Id.

The term “increases” is not an empty vessel that EPA can fill as it chooses. Instead, absent further congressional guidance, the term must be given its ordinary meaning. Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761 (2004); Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The ordinary meaning of “increase” is “to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality.” Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 2d Ed. (1999), at 969. Thus, a change that makes emissions greater “increases” them. EPA's interpretation contravenes the Act's plain meaning under Chevron Step One, or in the alternative “diverges from any realistic meaning” under Chevron Step Two. See, e.g., NRDC v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000).2

#### d---‘Expanding’ means to increase and ‘the scope’ defines permissible behavior.

Collins ’21 [Collins English Dictionary; copyright updated 2021; Collins Cobuild, “Expand the Scope,” https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/expand-the-scope]

expand the scope

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I wanted to work internationally and expand the scope of my possibilities.

Times, Sunday Times

Labour has called for the government to expand the scope of the test to include consideration of the impact of any merger on research and development and science.

Times, Sunday Times

Most opponents are small-government conservatives who are outraged at any attempt to expand the scope of government, particularly when it involves their personal healthcare decisions.

Times, Sunday Times

The move was cited by the developer to be to expand the scope of indie videogames, and not as a market strategy.

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Such results expand the scope of asymmetric hydroboration to more sterically demanding alkenes.

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Definition of 'expand'

expand

(ɪkspænd)

Explore 'expand' in the dictionary

VERB

If something expands or is expanded, it becomes larger. [...]

See full entry

COBUILD Advanced English Dictionary. Copyright © HarperCollins Publishers

Definition of 'scope'

scope

(skoʊp)

Explore 'scope' in the dictionary

UNCOUNTABLE NOUN [NOUN to-infinitive]

If there is scope for a particular kind of behaviour or activity, people have the opportunity to behave in this way or do that activity. [...]

#### e---‘Its’ means belonging to the fed.

Updegrave ’91 [W.C.; August 19; Supreme Law.org, “Explanation of ZIP Code Address Purpose,” <http://www.supremelaw.org/ref/zipcode/updegrav.htm>]

More specifically, looking at the map on page 11 of the National ZIP Code Directory, e.g. at a local post office, one will see that the first digit of a ZIP Code defines an area that includes more than one State. The first sentence of the explanatory paragraph begins: "A ZIP Code is a numerical code that identifies areas within the United States and its territories for purposes of ..." [cf. 26 CFR 1.1-1(c)]. Note the singular possessive pronoun "its", not "their", therefore carrying the implication that it relates to the "United States" as a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia (in the singular sense), not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union (in the plural sense). The map shows all the States of the Union, but it also shows D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, making the explanatory statement literally correct.

#### f---‘Core antitrust laws’ are legal statutes.

Pfaffenroth ’21 [Sonia K, Justin P Hedge, and Monique N Boyce; July 1; Partner at Arnold and Porter, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil and Criminal Operations for the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice; Counsel at Arnold and Porter; Senior Associate at Arnold and Porter; Mondaq, “United States: A Comparison Of Proposed Antitrust Legislation In 2021: Federal And New York State,” https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/antitrust-eu-competition-/1086194/a-comparison-of-proposed-antitrust-legislation-in-2021-federal-and-new-york-state#:~:text=At%20the%20federal%20level,%20there,;1%20(2)%20the%20Federal]

At the federal level, there are three core antitrust laws: (1) the Sherman Act, in which Section 1 outlaws "every contract, combination, or conspiracy in [unreasonable] restraint of trade," and Section 2 outlaws any "monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize";1 (2) the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices";2 and (3) Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."3 Criminal violations of the Sherman Act carry a maximum penalty of a $100 million fine for corporations, and a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine for individuals. A prevailing plaintiff in a civil suit can recover treble damages and attorneys' fees. But federal law currently does not provide for civil penalties when the government brings an antitrust case, only injunctive relief.

Key to limits and ground – they justify a proliferation of small, uncontroversial AFF’s that avoid core generics and water down the quality of debating.

#### Two impacts:

#### 1 – Competitive Equity – an unlimited, unpredictable topic disparately raises the research burden for the negative – treat this as a sufficient win condition because fairness is the logical structure that undergirds all impacts AND controls any benefit to debate.

#### 2 – Iteration – targeted research enables third and fourth-line testing necessary to motivate advocacy and argumentative reflection.

Iverson ’9 [Joel; 2009; Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Montana, Ph.D in Communication from Arizona State University Relations at the University of Sydney; Debate Central, “Can Cutting Cards Carve into Our Personal Lives: An Analysis of Debate Research on Personal Advocacy,” https://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html]

Mitchell (1998) provides a thorough examination of the pedagogical implication for academic debate. Although Mitchell acknowledges that debate provides preparation for participation in democracy, limiting debate to a laboratory where students practice their skill for future participation is criticized. Mitchell contends:

For students and teachers of argumentation, the heightened salience of this question should signal the danger that critical thinking and oral advocacy skills alone may not be sufficient for citizens to assert their voices in public deliberation. (p. 45)

Mitchell contends that the laboratory style setting creates barriers to other spheres, creates a "sense of detachment" and causes debaters to see research from the role of spectators. Mitchell further calls for "argumentative agency [which] involves the capacity to contextualize and employ the skills and strategies of argumentative discourse in fields of social action, especially wider spheres of public deliberation" (p. 45). Although we agree with Mitchell that debate can be an even greater instrument of empowerment for students, we are more interested in examining the impact of the intermediary step of research. In each of Mitchell's examples of debaters finding creative avenues for agency, there had to be a motivation to act. It is our contention that the research conducted for competition is a major catalyst to propel their action, change their opinions, and to provide a greater depth of understanding of the issues involved.

The level of research involved in debate creates an in-depth understanding of issues. The level of research conducted during a year of debate is quite extensive. Goodman (1993) references a Chronicle of Higher Education article that estimated "the level and extent of research required of the average college debater for each topic is equivalent to the amount of research required for a Master's Thesis (cited in Mitchell, 1998, p. 55). With this extensive quantity of research, debaters attain a high level of investigation and (presumably) understanding of a topic. As a result of this level of understanding, debaters become knowledgeable citizens who are further empowered to make informed opinions and energized to take action. Research helps to educate students (and coaches) about the state of the world.

Without the guidance of a debate topic, how many students would do in-depth research on female genital mutilation in Africa, or United Nations sanctions on Iraq? The competitive nature of policy debate provides an impetus for students to research the topics that they are going to debate. This in turn fuels students’ awareness of issues that go beyond their front doors. Advocacy flows from this increased awareness. Reading books and articles about the suffering of people thousands of miles away or right in our own communities drives people to become involved in the community at large.

Research has also focused on how debate prepares us for life in the public sphere. Issues that we discuss in debate have found their way onto the national policy stage, and training in intercollegiate debate makes us good public advocates. The public sphere is the arena in which we all must participate to be active citizens. Even after we leave debate, the skills that we have gained should help us to be better advocates and citizens. Research has looked at how debate impacts education (Matlon and Keele 1984), legal training (Parkinson, Gisler and Pelias 1983, Nobles 19850 and behavioral traits (McGlone 1974, Colbert 1994). These works illustrate the impact that public debate has on students as they prepare to enter the public sphere.

The debaters who take active roles such as protesting sanctions were probably not actively engaged in the issue until their research drew them into the topic. Furthermore, the process of intense research for debate may actually change the positions debaters hold. Since debaters typically enter into a topic with only cursory (if any) knowledge of the issue, the research process provides exposure to issues that were previously unknown. Exposure to the literature on a topic can create, reinforce or alter an individual's opinions. Before learning of the School for the America's, having an opinion of the place is impossible. After hearing about the systematic training of torturers and oppressors in a debate round and reading the research, an opinion of the "school" was developed. In this manner, exposure to debate research as the person finding the evidence, hearing it as the opponent in a debate round (or as judge) acts as an initial spark of awareness on an issue. This process of discovery seems to have a similar impact to watching an investigative news report.

Mitchell claimed that debate could be more than it was traditionally seen as, that it could be a catalyst to empower people to act in the social arena. We surmise that there is a step in between the debate and the action. The intermediary step where people are inspired to agency is based on the research that they do. If students are compelled to act, research is a main factor in compelling them to do so. Even if students are not compelled to take direct action, research still changes opinions and attitudes.

Research often compels students to take action in the social arena. Debate topics guide students in a direction that allows them to explore what is going on in the world. Last year the college policy debate topic was,

Resolved: That the United States Federal Government should adopt a policy of constructive engagement, including the immediate removal of all or nearly all economic sanctions, with the government(s) of one or more of the following nation-states: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea.

This topic spurred quite a bit of activism on the college debate circuit. Many students become actively involved in protesting for the removal of sanctions from at least one of the topic countries. The college listserve was used to rally people in support ofvarious movements to remove sanctions on both Iraq and Cuba. These messages were posted after the research on the topic began. While this topic did not lend itself to activism beyond rallying the government, other topics have allowed students to take their beliefs outside of the laboratory and into action.

In addition to creating awareness, the research process can also reinforce or alter opinions. By discovering new information in the research process, people can question their current assumptions and perhaps formulate a more informed opinion. One example comes from a summer debate class for children of Migrant workers in North Dakota (Iverson, 1999). The Junior High aged students chose to debate the adoption of Spanish as an official language in the U.S. Many students expressed their concern that they could not argue effectively against the proposed change because it was a "truism." They were wholly in favor of Spanish as an official language. After researching the topic throughout their six week course, many realized much more was involved in adopting an official language and that they did not "speak 'pure' Spanish or English, but speak a unique dialect and hybrid" (Iverson, p. 3). At the end of the class many students became opposed to adopting Spanish as an official language, but found other ways Spanish should be integrated into American culture. Without research, these students would have maintained their opinions and not enhanced their knowledge of the issue. The students who maintained support of Spanish as an official language were better informed and thus also more capable of articulating support for their beliefs.

The examples of debate and research impacting the opinions and actions of debaters indicate the strong potential for a direct relationship between debate research and personal advocacy. However, the debate community has not created a new sea of activists immersing this planet in waves of protest and political action. The level of influence debater search has on people needs further exploration. Also, the process of research needs to be more fully explored in order to understand if and why researching for the competitive activity of debate generates more interest than research for other purposes such as classroom projects.

Since parliamentary debate does not involve research into a single topic, it can provide an important reference point for examining the impact of research in other forms of debate. Based upon limited conversations with competitors and coaches as well as some direct coaching and judging experience in parliamentary debate, parliamentary forms of debate has not seen an increase in activism on the part of debaters in the United States. Although some coaches require research in order to find examples and to stay updated on current events, the basic principle of this research is to have a commonsense level of understanding(Venette, 1998). As the NPDA website explains, "the reader is encouraged to be well-read in current events, as well as history, philosophy, etc. Remember: the realm of knowledge is that of a 'well-read college student'" (NPDA Homepage,<http://www.bethel.edu/Majors/Communication/npda/faq2.html>). The focus of research is breadth, not depth. In fact, in-depth research into one topic for parliamentary debate would seem to be counterproductive. Every round has a different resolution and for APDA, at least, those resolutions are generally written so they are open to a wide array of case examples, So, developing too narrow of a focus could be competitively fatal. However, research is apparently increasing for parliamentary teams as reports of "stock cases" used by teams for numerous rounds have recently appeared. One coach did state that a perceived "stock case" by one team pushed his debaters to research the topic of AIDS in Africa in order to be equally knowledgeable in that case. Interestingly, the coach also stated that some of their research in preparation for parliamentary debate was affecting the opinions and attitudes of the debaters on the team.

Not all debate research appears to generate personal advocacy and challenge peoples' assumptions. Debaters must switch sides, so they must inevitably debate against various cases. While this may seem to be inconsistent with advocacy, supporting and researching both sides of an argument actually created stronger advocates. Not only did debaters learn both sides of an argument, so that they could defend their positions against attack, they also learned the nuances of each position. Learning and the intricate nature of various policy proposals helps debaters to strengthen their own stance on issues

## 2

### 1NC – Kritik

#### The 1ac’s resistance is framed by its imagination of a realm of discourse or knowledge that adheres to the form of given economies of desire. The aff is powerful precisely because it depicts a master who has access to certain privileges over subjects who are denied. However, desire organized thusly resists a master, without resisting mastery, and thus subscribes to a futile but nonetheless teleological project of overcoming the lack.

Rogers 15. Juliet Brough Rogers, professor of political science at the University of Melbourne (Australia), “A Stranger Politics: Resistance in Psychoanalytic Thought and Praxis” in Jacques Lacan: Between Psychoanalysis and Politics, Routledge, 2015: 186

The conundrum of change in psychoanalysis (and beyond) highlights the first of two particular problems of, and with, resistance that appear when the subject attempts such a change of rules. First, change rarely (if ever) involves the creation of what Douzinas (2013: 141) calls ‘a new political subject’. That is, subjects are always already subjected – let us say occupied – a priori and thus all imaginations of resistance are framed in a priori discourse. As such, the subjects’ imaginations, including their imaginations of the results of revolution – or of a new mode of being – are always colonized with what is available to them. This is why – for Žižek (2007) and for Lacan (2007) – in post-revolutionary states, what the subject will get is more of the same. The second problematic that haunts acts of resistance, and of more specific concern to psychoanalytic practice, is that any employment of violence as a means to an end, and particularly as an effort toward a violent unsettling of the regime, can only be understood as the effort to capture a definitive answer to the insistent and formative question to the Other, expressed by Lacan (2006) as,‘che vuoi Autre?’ – ‘what do you want from me?’ In some cases this may be a violent effort toward capture, exercised to the point of a defiance of the existence of the question. What this means is that one acts, violently, in order to produce a known future, as the answer. The two problematics of resistance overlap because the answer is always imagined in the terms/signifiers available from the past. That is, the answer appears in the frame of the categories which produce the subject, and thus recruits the first problematic: ‘you are (always) already subjected’. I’ll tackle these problematics in turn. First, ‘you are already subjected’. If we even partially accept Judith Butler’s (1997: 6) treatise on the formation of subjectivity as a series of ‘passionate attachments’ to ‘subjection’,10 then it is difficult to understand how the subject might be what Douzinas (2014) described as ‘re- or de-subjectivised’ in the first site of becoming a resisting subject.11 For the political subject of democracy, recognition is, as Claude Lefort (1989) has told us well, the condition of being a subject. This means recognition within the signifiers – let us call them biopolitical categories – allocated to the identity of the subject of democracy. The stage of political recognition is populated by signifiers which broker little dissent – by others and even by the self. In Butler’s terms, we are ‘passionately attached’ to our gender, imaginations of health, rights, and, in Lacan’s terms, the ‘goods’ – as objects and as ideas – which offer us the imagination of recognition. We are occupied as subjects through our own occupation with a recognizable identity before democracy, with the qualities (objects) that reflect that identity. This occupation allows for little, if any, dissent as to the naturalness, goodness, and reality of the signifiers that produce the subject – as signifiers which adhere fundamentally to economies of desires: as desires for recognition of identity and rights, as desires for capital. That is, the subject is occupied a priori with these categories and recognizes (and demands recognition) via these categories. If we accept the premises of subjection framed above then the argument follows that the resisting subject is still a subject, but one who looks for recognition beyond the common political forms. That is, we can say that the resisting subject is still ‘passionately attached’ to the ideas and objects which offer recognition, but these may be recognition by an alternative political party, a Cause or, in Lacanian psy- choanalysis, we would say s/he attaches to (another) Master’s discourse. They may resist one Master, but they chose another Master. They do not resist mastery. And here we have the basic difficulty with theories and actions of resistance. These difficulties are that somehow, in some way, any acts of resistance always become modes of, in Lacan’s terms, the desire for (another) Master (2007). Resistance, understood this way, is a state of being that is always already subjectivized within the parameters of its own claims, or within the parameters of the subject’s imagination of its goals. This is the obvious reference made by Lacan in his comments to the students who participated in the ‘resistances’ of 1968 in France (and elsewhere). As he says, ‘What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a Master. You will get one’ (Lacan 2007: 207).14 The provocative comment to the students – some of whom have come to listen to him and some who have come to (apparently) resist him – is a comment on their acting out the discourse of the Master that they imagine they can overcome, through listening (or even objecting) to another Master, namely, Lacan. In this attempt at resistance which falls prey to its own conditions of subjection, we can say that the subjectivity of the resisting subject – the student – is preoccupied with the signifiers available to resist, where the best they can hope for is to be re-occupied by the imagination of securing (another) truth. This hope, at least for the students in France at this time – understood through Lacan (and his discussions in 1969) – is the hope for the Other’s knowledge. A knowledge which the subject presumes the Other has. A knowledge which is imagined to be able to be accessed and had. A knowledge which is presented as the answer to the question ‘che vois Autre?’ And here appears the second psychoanalytic concern with resistance: resistance as a belief in an access to an answer, or, in its most extreme or crude terms, resistance as psychosis. Resistance, understood as a desire for a Master, becomes a performance of what the subject imagines is the answer. The answer as a closed course of action with a fixed teleological imagination, such that the resisting subject might say: ‘If I do this I will be this’, or ‘if I do this then the final result will be this’, or, in its psychotic form, ‘if I do this the world will be this’. It is important to stress, however, that this may not follow for all acts of resistance – which I will postulate later – but when Lacan says of the students in France that what they want is a Master, this form of psychotic achievement of an answer is precisely what he is referring to. Theirs is the desire for a discourse that holds within it the knowledge that the subject imagines is required (and can be acquired/obtained/had) to achieve a perfection of the signifier, an imagination that the subject can acquire, what Lacan (2007: 14–15) describes as the ‘Other’s jouissance’. The students, in Lacan’s suggestion, want to resist in order to obtain the answer when it is the existence of an answer at all they are supposedly resisting.

#### Their demand for racial recognition sustains the ability of whiteness to function as a master signifier that structures collective social desires --- the alternative’s psychoanalytic confrontation with the quixotic quest for racial wholeness enables the traversal of the racial fantasy that can best solve collective violence

George 14 [Sheldon, Associate Professor and Director of the Graduate Program in English. Simmons College of Arts and Sciences, “From alienation to cynicism: Race and the Lacanian unconscious,” *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society* 19.4, (Dec 2014): 360-378]

Separation, Impaired by Race

Lacan described separation as the significant step through which the subject of desire truly emerges. As is shown in Figure 2 - See PDF, above, he schematized the alienating vel through the image of a letter V, above which is placed an inverted V to represent the reverse process of "separation" that completes the subject's loop of development into full subjectivity and binds the subject to a desire that emerges in the losange of the unconscious. In this separation, what the subject has to "free himself of is the aphanisic effect of the binary signifier" (1998b, p. 219). Rooting subjectivity in "scepticism" as what Lacan called "a mode of sustaining man in life" (p. 224), Lacanian theory ties the reversal of alienation to a "cynic[ism]" by which the subject questions the desire of the Other who grants the signifier (p. 238). This cynicism, which Lacan tied to the establishment of a more personal relation to one's own desire, constitutes what I would call an ethical stance for the subject of race, one in which this subject comes to interrogate and reject the racial signifiers that mandate the subject's relation to being and the Other.

For Lacan, the significant living Other within the Symbolic is both the Other, who personifies the site of jouissance that is the illusory Real of wholeness, and the paternal authority, who represents the Symbolic and its law of desire but also facilitates alienation by granting access to the signifiers that define identity for the subject. Not accounting particularly for race as a complicating factor in this process of separation, Lacanian theory nonetheless shows that in separation the subject must first move toward recognition of the desire/lack both of the subject and of the Other, who functions as a fantasy source of bliss. The goal here is to shift from a stultifying obsession with being and bliss toward an embrace of the signifier and fantasy. Lacan explained, "[I]t is in so far as his desire is beyond or falls short of what she says, of what she hints at, of what she brings out in meaning, it is in so far as his desire is unknown, it is in this point of lack [recognizable in the desiring Other's meanings], that the desire of the subject is constituted" (p. 218-219). By filling the gaps left in the Other's discourse with his own meanings and fantasies, the subject thus constitutes in the losange of his unconscious a desire that institutes separation from the Other.

What emerges in this separation produced by desire and fantasy is the desiring subject whose completion of the loop from alienation to separation Lacan presented in his formula for fantasy, $\*a , read as the barred subject in relation to the fantasy object. But it is precisely a relation to this fantasy object that complicates matters for the subject of race. Because in the racist American Symbolic the goal of the signifier is to aggrandize the lost bliss of the Real, the Symbolic functions actively to impair the raced subject's separation from this Real while also fortifying this subject's alienation by the signifier. Lacanian scholar Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks has shown that the Symbolic is structured around the racial signifier whiteness, which functions as a "master signifier" by establishing a "structure of relations, a signifying chain that through a process of inclusions and exclusions constitutes a pattern for organizing human difference" (2008, p. 4). Though securing for only whites the hierarchal fantasy of their "sovereign humanness," whiteness presents itself as the ideal to which all subjects aspire (p. 55). Despite the subject's alienation from not only the part of the self constituted as the non-meaning of the unconscious but also the impossible Real, what this master signifier "promises the subject is precisely access to being" (p. 45), thus directing the racial subject toward the very Real from which this subject must separate.

It is this obsessive pursuit of the Real, thus encouraged by race, that can lead to the violence and frustration of racism. This frustration arises because whiteness can never reconstitute being. In truth, whiteness functions only as the object a that merely promises wholeness by simultaneously masquerading as the phallus, the castrated object that manifests the illusory site of bliss in the Imaginary form of the subjective-self. Distinguishing the phallus from "the organ" (2006b, p. 579), Lacan associated the phallus with Imaginary fantasies of lack, fantasies about "exclusion[s] from the specular image" (p. 697). It is such fantasies of bodily parts "falling off" from the Imaginary self that define the aggressivity, or sense of psychic fragmentation, that may lead to the aggression that invades race relations. Whiteness produces such aggressivity because it aims at an impossible ideal of completion that no living subject - not even a white subject - can ever embody. Providing ideals both for the physical human form and for its fragmented psychic structure that simply are unattainable, the very term "white" marks its own discursive and fantasy function by defying the phenotypic reality of all subjects. With the subject of race remaining incapable of maintaining in actuality the two central positions in relation to being articulated by Lacanian theory, those of either "being" or "having" the phallus, the best this subject can do is position himself as having the fantasy object a that functions as referent to the phallus, the illusory remainder that when positioned within the self leaves even the white subject always one step removed from the ideal he seeks to embody (p. 582). There is thus a fundamental frustration, insufficiency and aggressivity awakened by this ideal called forth by the illusion of whiteness.

The problem with contemporary theoretical and political approaches to the aggression and racism that still plague race relations today is that their frequent reliance upon the concept of race precludes engagement with this fundamental aggressivity produced by the concept itself. While recognizing the destructive power and persistence of the illusion of race, the attempt made by numbers of African American scholars is not to destroy this illusion; instead, it is to give the illusion new mythical meaning by adopting a process of resignification that is made intelligible by Derridean poststructuralist theory. Tying agency to resignification of existing signifiers, Jacques Derrida, the father of poststructuralism, described the need to ground what we may call a critical stance toward the Other in a process modeled by the "bricoleur" (Derrida, 1978, p. 285). As skeptical critic, the bricoleur recognizes "the necessity of borrowing one's concepts from the text of a heritage which is more or less coherent or ruined" (p. 285). His task is to embrace the "received historical discourse" while altering its meaning by putting it to a use for which it "had not been especially conceived" (p. 285). It is this approach of the bricoleur that African Americans have often embraced in accepting the terms of race posited by the racist Symbolic.

This approach is driven by the need to reinforce a sense of being that was visibly challenged by slavery and continues to be challenged by racism. In Lacanian terms, the goal here is to alter the fantasy relation to being. This alteration is addressed most directly at the object a that structures fantasies of race. Where it is the a that stands as the internal object common to members of the race - the fantasy essence within each African American - rearticulation of African American identity is aimed at revaluing this internal, fantasy self. This self is what is devalued in the racist Symbolic as the object a of whiteness gains the discursive dominance that facilitates its masquerade as phallus, as signifier of being and jouissance. It is thus only through this glorification of the fantasy object thought to link African Americans intersubjectively that the subject rooted in this identity establishes a relation to being, thereby alienating himself in the signifiers that also liberate him.

This paradoxical path toward freedom through alienation creates what I would identify as an ambivalent relation to race for African Americans, whereby they challenge its racist implications by embracing the distinctions of self and other it promotes. But because the very function of race is to make the self and other knowable only through fantasy - by which the racial other is not only already defined, but is also often already defined as enemy –

what I propose is a traversal of the fantasy of race. This traversal involves separation not only from the Real represented by the mother, but also from the Symbolic that redirects the raced subject to this Real through buttressing the fantasy a of race. While racial identity can petrify the subject into the signifier of his or her race, thus contributing to the aphanisis of the raced subject's being, I argue that through a cynical questioning of the mandates and signifiers of the racial Symbolic the raced subject may attain an "obstacle to his fading," one that involves this subject coming to "recognize" his racial desire "as desire of the Other," as a desire shaped by a Symbolic structure that precedes and delimits the raced subject's existence (1998b, p. 235).

The Drive and Traversal of the Racial Fantasy

Most important in this traversal of race is an essential recognition of the lack in the signifiers of the Other, a recognition that the signifier does not capture the subject's entire being. Especially apparent in signifiers of race - like "black boy" -, there is always a left over, a part of the self that cannot emerge fully through the racial signifiers' subjective meanings. It is this very failure of the signifier that is highlighted in Figure 1 - See PDF,, wherein the circle of being designates an entire portion of the split subject that exists in the Real and is only partially accessible through the unconscious. The first implication of the fact that being is elided by the signifier's meaning is that, as we have seen, the subject is thus petrified into a signifier and simultaneously alienated from that part of the self that can be, but is not, signified by language, that part situated in the unconscious, where being and signification overlap to create non-meaning. But more radical than this is the implication that there is a part of the subject that is not available to the operations of the signifier but yet may express itself through desire, the part that comprises the rest of the circle of being. As Lacan argued, desire is "the metonymy of our being," and the "channel in which desire is located is not simply that of the modulation of the signifying chain" (1997, p. 321). This desire, I suggest, is what can facilitate an ethical separation of the S1 and S2, creating critical distance from the signifier and opening up a space for the subject to access better that of the self which escapes the signifier.

If we return to Fanon's Jean Veneuse, what we see is exactly a desire for abandonment that escapes signification and indeed grants structure to the signifiers that define subjectivity, organizing them by their effort to repress this desire. The escape of desire from the signifier is possible because the Lacanian subject is not merely the subject of the signifier, who "appears in the field of the Other," but also "the subject in the field of the drive," (1998b, p. 199), where desire functions as that which is "agitated in the drive" (p. 243). Characterized by a "constant force," a tension that is at odds with the homeostasis and delayed gratification promised by the signifier (p. 164), the drive is "different from any stimulation coming from the outside world" because it is an "internal" force (p. 164). It emerges from the libido as "pure life instinct," "irrepressible" and "indestructible life" (p. 198). This libido, manifesting itself most appropriately as that which "the sexed being loses in sexuality" (p. 197), is connected to Freud's notion of the subject as initially "polymorphous, aberrant," able to attain pleasure from all sources, but as subsequently forced to localize pleasure in the erogenous zones (p. 176). The signifier and the mores of the Symbolic institute a homeostasis that restricts "sexuality," as a manifestation of the force of the libido, into coming "into play only in the form of partial drives" (p. 176), so that we "deal only with that part of sexuality that passes" into "the networks of the signifier" (p. 177); but the force of this immortal libido insistently marks its presence at the site of the "gaps that the distribution of the signifying investments sets up in the subject" (p. 180). We see this insistence, for example, in parapraxis, as something slips through the network of the signifier, something emerging from the "losage \*," from the unconscious as a gap that Lacan places "at the centre of any relation" between "reality and the subject" (p. 181). It is because the force of what emerges from the unconscious in this movement outward directs the subject to the Other that the drive holds particular importance to an understanding of race.

What race encourages through the Other is substitution of desire for the drive, as it petrifies the subject in a stagnant relation to the fantasy object. The movement of the drive involves a "circular" path out from the gaps of subjectivity toward the Other and back to the subject (1998b, p. 178). In the place of the Other, the drive encounters and closes in on "the petit a ," which is "in fact simply the presence of a hollow, a void" that "can be occupied by any object" but that functions as representative of the "lost object" (p. 180). In the American Symbolic, I contend, the object a of race, acquired from the Other, binds the racial subject to this circular path around a hollow that serves as the source of identity. Unlike the path of desire, which involves a continual metonymic movement from object to object in search of a source of satisfaction, the drive endlessly circles its illusive object, "attaining its satisfaction without attaining its aim" (p. 179). While failing to attain the racial identity represented by the object a of race, the subject of race yet still remains bound to the a because the a of race becomes integral to the drive's function not just of "making oneself seen ," but more fundamentally of "making oneself " (p. 195). In encountering the object a defined by the Other, the subject acquires in this object, in race, a "little mirror," an "illusion" of self, to which the subject may "accommodate his own image" (p. 159). We can say that in race the subject "assumes the role of the object," embracing the reversal whereby it is the jouissance and demands of the Other that are privileged (p. 185).

But this static objectification stifles the metonymy of desire. The fantasy object petrifying the self becomes the master signifier through which a "primal" repression of being is achieved, and what is "built on" the signifier, as we saw with Vaneuse, is "the symptom" of the subject, "constituted" as a "scaffolding of signifiers" (1998b, p. 176). It is because of the satisfaction gained from the symptom, the jouissance and sense of being granted by race as the soul or remnant of a lost being, that the drive need not reach its aim of hitting the mark set by race as object a . This satisfaction is sustained as the source of a subjective self with "nothing else" ensuring its "consistency except the object, as something that must be circumvented," something both aimed at and missed (p. 181). Lacan tied the pleasure of the symptom upheld by the drive to a kind of autoeroticism that he described in the image of "a mouth sewn up" in "certain silences," closed "upon its own satisfaction" (p. 179). It is this closing up upon a jouissance of pain and pleasure, this insertion into the self of the Other's signifier, that I associate with race.

However, Lacanian theory also shows that "by snatching at its object, the drive learns in a sense that this is precisely not the way it will be satisfied" (1998b, p. 167). I suggest that the existing ambivalence about race of both African Americans and white Americans makes possible increased recognition that race does not produce the sovereign humanness or supreme satisfaction that binds subjects to race as a fantasy source of being. Though the extent to which recent events in America mark a permanent shift in relations to the signifiers of race is yet to be seen, whiteness itself and the very value of race have been cynically questioned in the wake of publicized incidents of "white"-on-"black" murders - like the shootings of Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman, and Jordan Davis by Michael Dunn - and police-on- "black" killings, like the death of Eric Garner in an illegal chokehold by New York police who alleged he was unlawfully selling cigarettes. 5 In light of active protests in Missouri after 18-year-old Michael Brown was shot by police in the streets of Ferguson, some have even argued optimistically that we are bearing witness to a "new civil rights movement which has sprung up" (Ifill, 2014). Whether or not this movement comes to full fruition, it is precisely a process of bearing witness that is key to its development thus far. What I suggest has occurred in the immediate aftermath of the killing of these black men is a shift in many Americans' scopic relation to the Other.

At issue in this shift is the gaze of the Other, which Lacan stated "has the effect of arresting movement" and halting transgression (1998b, p. 118). What objectifies the subject, as the movement of his or her drive binds the subject to the jouissance of the a , is subjection to an "entirely hidden gaze" of the Other, which the subject positions as a policing authority for whom the subject performs his or her identity (p. 182). This disembodied observer and judge constitutes an extimacy that polices unconscious desires, ensuring that "it is in the space of the Other that [the subject] sees himself and the point from which he looks at himself is also in that space" (p. 144). This space of the "capital Other," Lacan said, is the "locus of speech," the Symbolic (p. 129). Where Lacan associated this locus with the law, the law of the father and the law of desire, it can be said that this hidden gaze is often given presence by the police. Embodying the arresting gaze that "surprises" the subject in his moment of transgression, the police should allow to arise "the conflagration of shame" that realigns the subject's desire away from the pathological object of his or her fixation (p. 182). But while the police of Ferguson have facilitated an ostensive realignment of America's subjective relation to the object of race, they have done so by also largely dispossessing themselves of the agency of the shaming gaze.

Indeed, after the killing of the unarmed Michael Brown by police on August 18th, 2014, the agency of the shaming gaze was notably transferred to the community and the larger American and international public in turn. The community was the first to watch as the body of Michael Brown lay in the streets for hours. Marking this indignity in his eulogy at Brown's funeral, the Reverend Al Sharpton recalls that for "four and a half hours" the "family couldn't come to the ropes" but were left to watch "Dogs sniffin' through" (2014). Explaining that it signaled to him "how many of us are considered nothing," how "we were just so marginalized and ignored," Sharpton displays his own struggles against a Symbolic that destroys African Americans' fantasies of being (2014): he emphasizes, it was like Brown's "life value didn't matter" (2014). But Sharpton's rhetoric throughout the eulogy also marks the shift of the public gaze toward the Ferguson police and America itself. He asks, "How do you think we look when the world can see you can't come up with a police report?" - which was only produced with sparse details almost two weeks after the shooting - and "how do you think we look when young people march nonviolently asking for the land of the free and the home of the brave to hear their cry, and you put snipers on the roof and point guns on them?" (2014). Highlighting what many in the media and the public see as excessive force in the police's response to protestors, Sharpton exhorts, "America, it's time to deal with policing" (2014).

Sharpton's rhetoric echoes a larger national shift whereby the authority of the police as enforcer of the law and holder of the gaze is cynically challenged. As a reverend himself, Sharpton transfers the gaze from the earthly agency of the law to the divine agency of God, asking the mourners, "What does the Lord require of you" as response to the killing? (2014). But Sharpton finally pins both agency and responsibility to the self, arguing that "nobody gonna help us if we don't help ourselves," so "we've got to [start] a movement" (2014). Throughout, Sharpton's rhetoric directs the shaming gaze to the police by positioning this gaze as the possession alternately of the community, Americans in general, the international community that sees an America bound to practices of the past, and the heavenly authority who is positioned in judgment of all these participants. The eulogy contributes to and charts the optical shift that, now making the Ferguson police the object of the shaming gaze, has led not only to public calls for body cameras to document police activity but also to federal investigation of the Ferguson police department by the United States Department of Justice. This shifting of the gaze goes some way toward freeing the subject from the power of the policing Other, whose abuse and even transgressions of the law unveil the inherent racism of the Symbolic itself. With the Symbolic Other's capacity to define the raced African American subject cynically challenged, the individual African American is positioned to define more freely his or her own identity.

The possibility opened up here is dual, offering the subject access to an identity grounded in a reconfigured relation either to the fantasy a or to an individual desire actuated by the drive. Already emulating the metonymy of desire, the shifting of the gaze away from the line of sight traced in the vision of the policing Other and toward perception of the violent excesses this Other embraces because of race, opens up the object a of race to reevaluation by diverse onlookers. Through this displacement of the gaze, the violence that emerges from racial identity can be put to uses for which it was not intended, helping to fortify the poststructuralist approach of evolving African American identity through the bricolage of self-redefinition. But it can also, at the more individual level of the subject who is racialized as African American, issue a challenge to the very concept of race itself.

Conclusion

Though the ethical responsibility of issuing this challenge to the concept of race is ceded through the glorification of the a , this responsibility is established even in the model of poststructuralism that holds such sway over contemporary thinking about social change, wherein the ultimate aim of the theory is not an essentialist but a strategic deployment of identity. In the poststructuralist vision, because the given identity is "never fully owned," it remains open to "urgent and expanding political purposes" that demand shifting allegiances across such lines as race, class and gender (Butler, 1993, p. 228). But while poststructuralism produces this politics driven by a metonymic shift in subjective positionality by assuming a center-less self untethered from all identity, I envision through psychoanalysis the subject's encounter with an excluded center masked by the illusions of this subject's embraced identities. Where belief in race threatens to bind the subject to the fantasies of wholeness secured by the object a , and where true poststructuralist resignification of race forecloses recognition of the deeper drives that guide the identity politics of the individual subject, such a potentially seminal moment in the reconfiguration of race offers the racialized subject a unique opportunity to attempt a Lacanian traversal of race that can ground individual political activity in deeper recognition of the subject's desire.

Lacan specified that the object a "plays the role of obturator," inhibiting such recognition by facilitating the "closing of the unconscious" (1998b, p. 144). Aimed at an impossible wholeness, what the object a of race attempts is to fill the constitutive gaps in the subject, the spaces left unoccupied by the subject's absent being. But Lacanian theory stipulates that the "subject who has traversed the radical fantasy [can] experience the drive" that exudes from the space of these gaps (p. 273). Where this drive is an expression of the undirected libido whose "effective presence" is registered only in "desire," it is through the process of reorienting one's desire away from such fantasies as race that the subject may begin the process of experiencing and directing this internal tension of the drive (p. 153). Through the process of "mapping" one's own desire in one's cynical questioning of the object a presented by the Other (p. 273), the subject is placed upon the "track of something that is specifically [her] business," situating herself in relation to a desire and drive that is particularly her own belonging (1997, p. 319). It is perhaps most likely that the recent attention to repeated incidents of deadly violence to black men will not produce sustained social skepticism about the value of race, for "the loop" of the fundamental fantasy, Lacan stressed, "must be run through several times" if the subject is to free himself truly from the illusions of the Other. However, the unconscious gap opened up by this cynical response to race at the national level allows essential space for the initial movements of the individual subject of race along the path of this loop.

#### Their commitment to a politics of critique, disorientation, and interruption papers over the patriarchal economy of desire that forms the substrate of hegemonic politics. The ultimate function is to sustain the order of mastery that produces the conditions of possibility for imperialization

Lundberg 12 [Christian O. Lundberg, Director of Cultural Studies and Associate Professor of Rhetoric at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012, *Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric*, pub. University Alabama Press, p. 165-175]

Contemporary and classical liberal democratic theories presume that the demand is a way of exerting agency and, further, that the more firmly the demand is lodged, the greater the production of an agential effect. The Lacanian framing of the demand sees the relationship as exactly the opposite: the more firmly one lodges a demand, the more desperately one clings to the legitimate ability of an institution to fulfill it. Hypothetically, demands ought reach a kind of breaking point where the inability of an institution or order to proffer a response should produce a reevaluation of the economy of demand and desire. In analytic terms, this is the moment of subtraction, where the manifest content of the demand is stripped away and the desire that underwrites it is laid bare. The result of this “subtraction” is that the subject is in a position to relate to its desire, not as a set of deferrals, avoidances, or transposition but rather as an owned political disposition. As Lacan frames it, demanding subjects are either learning to reassert the centrality of their demand or coming to terms with the impotence of the Other as a satisfier of demands: “But it is in the dialectic of the demand for love and the test of desire that development is ordered. . . . [T]his test of the desire of the Other is decisive not in the sense that the subject learns by it whether or not he has a phallus, but in the sense that he learns that the mother does not have it.”39 The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might “recognize and name” their own desire and, as a result, become a political subject in the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on the other as a support for or organizing principle for political identity. Thus, desire has both a general status and a specific status for each subject. It is not just the mirror that produces the subject and its investments but the desire and sets of proxy objects that cover over this original gap. As Easthope puts it: “Lacan is sure that everyone’s desire is somehow different and their own—lack is nevertheless my lack. How can this be if each of us is just lost in language . . . passing through demand into desire, something from the Real, from the individual’s being before language, is retained as a trace enough to determine that I desire here and there, not anywhere and everywhere. Lacan terms this objet petit a . . . petit a is different for everyone; and it can never be in substitutes for it in which I try to refind it.”40 Though individuated, this naming is not about discovering a latently held but hidden interiority, rather it is about naming a practice of thinking the uniqueness of individual subjects as a product of discourses that produce them. Thus, this is an account of political subjectivization that is not solely oriented toward or determined by the locus of the demand but that is also determined by the contingent sets of coping strategies that orient a subject toward others and a political order and serve as the condition of possibility for demands. As Lacan argues, this is the point where a subject becomes a kind of new presence or a new political possibility: “That the subject should come to recognize and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn’t a question of recognizing something which would be entirely given. . . . In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world.”41 Alternatively, subjects can stay fixated on the demand, but in doing so they forfeit their desire, or as Fink argues, “an analysis . . . that . . . does not go far enough in constituting the subject as desire leaves him or her stranded at the level of demand . . . unable to truly desire.”42 A politics defined by and exhausted in demands is by definition a hysterical politics. The hysteric is defined by incessant demands on the other at the expense of ever articulating a desire that is theirs. In the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argues that the hysteric’s demand that the Other produce an object is the support of an aversion toward one’s desire: “the behavior of the hysteric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centered on the object, insofar as this object . . . is . . . the support of an aversion.”43 This economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their demands. On one hand, the hysteric asserts their agency, even authority, over the Other. Yet, what appears as unfettered agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a surrender of desire by enjoying the act of figuring the other as the one with the exclusive capability to satisfy the demand. Thus, “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students’ call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire. Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. Imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization.

#### The 1ac’s investment in the narrative power of the PRL, verbatim, and MPJ as being powered by a transcendant whiteness participates in a mythologization of whiteness ultimately positioning the racial subject in a permanent state of pain and suffering

Mbembe 15. Achille Mbembe, “Achille Mbembe on The State of South African Political Life,” Africa As A Country, September 19, 2015, http://africasacountry.com/2015/09/achille-mbembe-on-the-state-of-south-african-politics/

The old politics of waiting is therefore gradually replaced by a new politics of impatience and, if necessary, of disruption. Brashness, disruption and a new anti-decorum ethos are meant to bring down the pretence of normality and the logics of normalization in this most “abnormal” society.  Steve Biko, Frantz Fanon and a plethora of black feminist, queer, postcolonial, decolonial and critical race theorists are being reloaded in the service of a new form of militancy less accommodationist and more trenchant both in form and content.

The age of impatience is an age when a lot is said – all sorts of things we had hardly heard about during the last twenty years; some ugly, outrageous, toxic things, including calls for murder, atrocious things that speak to everything except to the project of freedom, in this age of fantasy and hysteria, when the gap between psychic realities and actual material realities has never been so wide, and the digital world only serves as an amplifier of every single moment, event and accident.

The age of urgency is also an age when new wounded bodies erupt and undertake to actually occupy spaces they used to simply haunt. They are now piling up, swearing and cursing, speaking with excrements, asking to be heard.

They speak in allegories and analogies – the “colony”, the “plantation”, the “house Negro”, the “field Negro”, blurring all boundaries, embracing confusion, mixing times and spaces, at the risk of anachronism.

They are claiming all kinds of rights – the right to violence; the right to disrupt and jam that which is parading as normal; the right to insult, intimidate and bully those who do not agree with them; the right to be angry, enraged; the right to go to war in the hope of recovering what was lost through conquest; the right to hate, to wreak vengeance, to smash something, it doesn’t matter what, as long as it looks “white”.

All these new “rights” are supposed to achieve one thing we are told the 1994 “peaceful settlement” did not achieve – decolonization and retributive justice, the only way to restore a  modicum of dignity to victims of the injuries of yesterday and today.

Demythologizing whiteness

And yet, some hard questions must be asked.

Why are we invested in turning whiteness, pain and suffering into such erotogenic objects?

Could it be that the concentration of our libido on whiteness, pain and suffering is after all typical of the narcissistic investments so privileged by this neoliberal age?

To frame the issues in these terms does not mean embracing a position of moral relativism. How could it be? After all, in relation to our history, too many lives were destroyed in the name of whiteness. Furthermore, the structural repetition of past sufferings in the present is beyond any reasonable doubt.  Whiteness as a necrophiliac power structure and a primary shaper of a global system of unequal redistribution of life chances will not die a natural death.

But to properly engineer its death – and thus the end of the nightmare it has been for a large portion of the humanity – we urgently need to demythologize it.

If we fail to properly demythologize whiteness, whiteness – as the machine in which a huge portion of the humanity has become entangled in spite of itself – will end up claiming us.

As a result of whiteness having claimed us; as a result of having let ourselves be possessed by it in the manner of an evil spirit, we will inflict upon ourselves injuries of which whiteness, at its most ferocious, would scarcely have been capable.

Indeed for whiteness to properly operate as the destructive force it is in the material sphere, it needs to capture its victim’s imagination and turn it into a poison well of hatred.

For victims of white racism to hold on to the things that truly matter, they must incessantly fight against the kind of hatred which never fails to destroy, in the first instance, the man or woman who hates while leaving the structure of whiteness itself intact.

As a poisonous fiction that passes for a fact, whiteness seeks to institutionalize itself as an event by any means necessary. This it does by colonizing the entire realms of desire and of the imagination.

To demythologize whiteness, it will not be enough to force “bad whites” into silence or into confessing guilt and/or complicity. This is too cheap.

To puncture and deflate the fictions of whiteness will require an entirely different regime of desire, new approaches in the constitution of material, aesthetic and symbolic capital, another discourse on value, on what matters and why.

And yet, as new struggles unfold, hard questions have to be asked. They have to be asked if, in an infernal cycle of repetition but no difference, one form of damaged life is not simply to be replaced by another.

The force of affect

Indeed the ground is fast shifting and a huge storm seems to be building up on the horizon. May 68? Soweto 76? Or something entirely different?

The winds blowing from our campuses can be felt afar, in a different idiom, in those territories of abandonment where the violence of poverty and demoralization having become the norm, many have nothing to lose and are now more than ever willing to risk a fight. They simply can no longer wait, having waited for too long now.

Out there, from almost every corner of this vast land seems to stretch a chain of young men and women rigid with tension.

As tension slowly swells up, it becomes ever more important to hold on to the things that truly matter.

A new cultural temperament is gradually engulfing post-apartheid urban South Africa. For the time being, it goes by the name “decolonization” – in truth a psychic state more than a political project in the strict sense of the term.

Whatever the case, everything seems to indicate that ours is a crucial moment in the redefinition of what counts as “social protagonism” in this country. Mobilizations over crucial matters such as access to health care, sanitation, housing, clean water or electricity might still be conducted in the name of the implicit promise inherent to the struggle years – that life after freedom will be “better” for all.

But fewer and fewer actually believe it. And as the belief in that promise fast recedes, raw affect, raw emotions and raw feelings are harnessed and recycled back into the political itself. In the process, new voices increasingly render old ones inaudible, while anger, rage and eventually muted grief seem to be the new markers of identity and agency.

Psychic bonds – in particular bonds of pain and bonds of suffering – more than lived material contradictions are becoming the real stuff of political inter-subjectivity. “I am my pain” – how many times have I heard this statement in the months since #RhodesMustFall emerged? “I am my suffering” and this subjective experience is so incommensurable that “unless you have gone through the same trial, you will never understand my condition” – the fusion of self and suffering in this astonishing age of solipsism and narcissism.

So it is that the relative cultural hegemony the African National Congress (ANC) exercised on black South African imagination during the years of the struggle is fast waning. In the bloody miasma of the Zuma years, these years of stagnation, rent-seeking and mediocrity parading as leadership, there is hardly any center left standing as institutions after institutions crumble under the weight of corruption, a predatory new black élite and the cynicism of former oppressors.

In the bloody miasma of the Zuma years, the discourse of black power, self-affirmation and worldliness of the early 1990s is in danger of being replaced by the discourse of fracture, injury and victimization – identity politics and the resentment that always is its corollary.

Rainbowism and its most important articles of faith – truth, reconciliation and forgiveness – is fading. Reduced to a totemic commodity figure mostly destined to assuage whites’ fears, Nelson Mandela himself is on trial. Some of the key pillars of the 1994 dispensation – a constitutional democracy, a market society, non-racialism – are also under scrutiny. They are now perceived as disabling devices with no animating potency, at least in the eyes of those who are determined to no longer wait. We are past the time of promises. Now is the time to settle accounts.

But how do we make sure that one noise machine is not simply replacing another?

Settling Accounts

The fact is this – nobody is saying nothing has changed. To say nothing has changed would be akin to indulging in willful blindness.

Hyperboles notwithstanding, South Africa today is not the “colony” Frantz Fanon is writing about in his Wretched of the Earth.

If we cannot find a proper name for what we are actually facing, then rather than simply borrowing one from a different time, we should keep searching.

What we are hearing is that there have not been enough meaningful, decisive, radical change, not only in terms of the life chances of the black poor, but – and this is the novelty – in terms of the future prospects of the black middle class.

What is being said is that twenty years after freedom, we have not disrupted enough the structures that maintain and reproduce “white power and supremacy”; that this is the reason why too many amongst us are trapped in a “bad life” that keeps wearing them out and down; that this wearing out and down of black life has been going on for too long and must now be brought to an end by all means necessary (the right to violence?).

We are being told that we have not radically overturned the particular sets of interests that are produced and reproduced through white privilege in institutions of public and private life – in law firms, in financial institutions such as banking and insurance, in advertising and industry, in terms of land redistribution, in media, universities, languages and culture in general.

“Whiteness”, “white power”, “white supremacy”, “white monopoly capital” is firmly back on the political and cultural agenda and to be white in South Africa now is to face a new-old kind of trial although with new judges – the so-called “born-free.”

#### We don’t need an alternative besides our framework of analysis – the fantasy will reveal itself as long as we continue asking questions to expose their concealment of the lack – in other words, it’s your job to confuse and frustrate them via a refusal to partake in their politics

Dean 6 [Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, *Zizek’s Politics,* Taylor & Francis: London and New York, 2006, p. xvii-xx]

By inserting popular culture into his writing, and himself into popular culture, Zizek enacts the way enjoyment colors or stains all thinking and acting. What this means, as I set out in detail in Chapter Three, is that there is a deep nonrational and libidinal nugget in even the most rational, formal ways of thinking. Again, it is not simply that popular culture is at the core of the theoretical enterprise of his books—it is that enjoyment is. Enjoyment is an unavoidable component of any philosophical effort (though many try to deny it). Zizek thus emphasizes the inevitable stain on philosophy, on thought, as he tries to demonstrate a way of thinking that breaks with (Zizek often uses Lacan's term traverses) the fantasy of "pure reason."

This leads to another key element of Zizek's thought: the possibility of taking the position of the excess. As I explain in discussions of his readings of St. Paul and Lenin, Zizek theorizes revolutionary politics as occurring through the occupation of this excessive place. Paul endeavors to put the Christian message to work, to establish new collectives beyond old oppositions between Greeks and Jews. Lenin also breaks with the given, arguing against all around him and against Marxist orthodoxy that the time for revolution is now, that it cannot be predicted, awaited, but must be accomplished with no assurances of success. Like Paul, he puts truth to work, organizing it in the form of a revolutionary political Party.

Zizek emphasizes that Lacan conceptualized this excessive place, this place without guarantees, in his formula for "the discourse of the analyst" (which I set out in Chapter Two). In psycho-analysis, the analyst just sits there, asking questions from time to time. She is some kind of object or cipher onto which the analysand transfers love, desire, aggression, and knowledge. The analysand, in other words, proceeds through analysis by positing the analyst as someone who knows exactly what is wrong with him and exactly what he should do to get rid of his symptom and get better. But, really, the analyst does not know. Moreover, the analyst steadfastly refuses to provide the analysand with any answers whatsoever. No ideals, no moral certainty, no goals, no choices. Nothing. This is what makes the analyst so traumatic, Zizek explains, the fact that she refuses to establish a law or set a limit, that she does not function as some kind of new master.7 Analysis is over when the analysand accepts that the analyst does not know, that there is not any secret meaning or explanation, and then takes responsibility for getting on with his life. The challenge for the analysand, then, is freedom, autonomously determining his own limits, directly assuming his own enjoyment. So, again, the position of the analyst is in this excessive place as an object through which the analysand works through the analytical process.

Why is the analyst necessary in the first place? If she is not going to tell the analysand what to do, how he should be living, then why does he not save his money, skip the whole process, and figure out things for himself? There are two basic answers. First, the analysand is not self-transparent. He is a stranger to himself, a decentered agent "struggling with a foreign kernel."8 What is more likely than self-understanding, is self-misunderstanding, that is, one's fundamental misperception of one's own condition. Becoming aware of this misperception, grappling with it, is the work of analysis. Accordingly, second, the analyst is that external agent or position that gives a new form to our activity. Saying things out loud, presenting them to another, and confronting them in front of this external position concretizes and arranges our thoughts and activities in a different way, a way that is more difficult to escape or avoid. The analyst then provides a form through which we acquire a perspective on and a relation to our selves.

Paul's Christian collectives and Lenin's revolutionary Party are, for Zizek, similarly formal arrangements, forms "for a new type of knowledge linked to a collective political subject."9 Each provides an external perspective on our activities, a way to concretize and organize our spontaneous experiences. More strongly put, a political Party is necessary precisely because politics is not given; it does not arise naturally or organically out of the multiplicity of immanent flows and affects but has to be produced, arranged, and constructed out of these flows in light of something larger.

In my view, when Zizek draws on popular culture and inserts himself into this culture, he is taking the position of an object of enjoyment, an excessive object that cannot easily be recuperated or assimilated. This excessive position is that of the analyst as well as that of the Party. Reading Zizek as occupying the position of the analyst tells us that it is wrong to expect Zizek to tell us what to do, to provide an ultimate solution or direction through which to solve all the world's problems. The analyst does not provide the analysand with ideals and goals; instead, he occupies the place of an object in relation to which we work these out for ourselves. In adopting the position of the analyst, Zizek is also practicing what he refers to as "Bartleby politics," a politics rooted in a kind of refusal wherein the subject turns itself into a disruptive (of our peace of mind!) violently passive object who says, "I would prefer not to."10 Thus, to my mind, becoming preoccupied with Zizek's style is like becoming preoccupied with what one's analyst is wearing. Why such a preoccupation? How is this preoccupation enabling us to avoid confronting the truth of our desire, our own investments in enjoyment? How is complaining that Zizek (or the analyst) will not tell us what to do a way that we avoid trying to figure this out for ourselves?11